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1. Introduction
In recent years, a large amount of work on chaos-based cryptosystems has been published
(Kocarev (2001); Millérioux et al. (2008)). A general methodology for designing chaotic and
hyperchaotic cryptosystems has been developed using the control systems theory (Grassi
et al. (1999); Liao et al. (1999); Yang et al. (1997a;b)). The chaotic communication system
is closely related to the concept of chaos synchronization. An overview of chaotic secure
communication systems can be found in (Yang (2004)). He classified the continuous-time
chaotic secure communication systems into four generations. In the third generation, the
combination of the classical cryptographic technique and chaotic synchronization is used
to enhance the degree of security. Specifically, Yang et al. proposed a new chaos-based
secure communication scheme in an attempt to thwart the attacks (Yang et al. (1997a;b)).
They have combined both conventional cryptographic method and synchronization of chaotic
systems. Their cryptographic method consists of an encryption function (the multi-shift
cipher), a decryption function (the inverse of the encryption function), a chaotic encrypter
that generates the key signal for the encryption function, and a decrypter that estimates
the key signal. The approach has a limitation since the cryptosystem design may fail if
different chaotic circuits are utilized. So far, this generation has the highest security in all the
chaotic communication systems had been proposed and has not yet broken. From the control
theoretic perspective, the transmitter and the receiver in the chaotic communication system
can be considered as the nonlinear plant and its observer, respectively. Grassi et al. proposed
a nonlinear-observer-based decrypter to reconstruct the state of the encrypter (Grassi et
al. (1999); Liao et al. (1999)). They extended the Chua’s oscillator to the observer-based
decrypter. The cryptosystem does not require initial conditions of the encrypter and the
decrypter belonging to the same basin of attraction. If we can design a decrypter without
the knowledge of the parameters of the encrypter, the chaos-based secure communication
systems are not secure, because the parameters of the encrypter is selected as static secret keys
in the cryptosystem. Parameter identification and adaptive synchronization methods may
be effective for intruders in building reconstruction mechanisms, even when a synchronizing
system is not available. Therefore, it is important for secure issues to investigate whether
adaptive identifiers without the system information of encrypter can be constructed or not.
We have recently designed an observer-based chaotic communication system combining the
cryptosystems proposed by Grassi et al. (Grassi et al. (1999)) and by Liao et al. (Liao
et al. (1999)) that allows us to assign the relative degree and the zeros of its encrypter
system (Matsuo et al. (2004)). Specifically, we constructed three cryptosystems based on
a Chua’s circuit by assigning its relative degree and zeros. The cryptosystem consists of
20
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an encryption function (the multi-shift cipher), a decryption function (the inverse of the
encryption function), a chaotic encrypter that generates the key signal for the encryption
function, and a decrypter that estimates the key signal. The proposed cryptosystem allows us
to assign the relative degree and the zeros of the encrypter dynamics by selecting an output
vector that generates a transmitted signal as partial states of the encrypter. As in (Fradkov et
al. (1997; 2000)), we can design an adaptive decrypter for minimum-phase systems with its
relative degree 1. Therefore, the encrypter dynamics should be design such that its relative
degree is more than two and its zeros are unstable so as to fail to synchronize the cryptosystem
adaptively. At the same time, the designed cryptosystem should be robust with respect to
uncertainties of the transmission lines such as a time delay, and noises. Suykens et al. (Suykens
et al. (1997a;b)) presented a nonlinear H∞ synchronization method for chaotic Lur’e systems
based on the dissipativity of nonlinear systems to minimize the influence of the exogenous
input such as the message signal and channel noises.
However, many proposed systemswith robustness against parameter uncertainties and signal
uncertainties are difficult to implement in practice with a reasonable degree of security. The
basic difference between the conventional cryptography and the chaos cryptography is that
the conventional encryption is defined discrete sets and the chaos encryption is defined on
continuous sets. This makes the keyspace behavior of chaotic systems vary different that of
conventional systems. Due to the continuous-value property, keys in chaotic cryptosystems
form a key basin around the actual secret key.
When one key is very close to the real one, it could decrypt part or all of the ciphertext (Alvarez
et al. (2006)). To avoid brute-force attacks, a secret parameter should be sensitive enough to
guarantee the so-called avalanche property: even when the smallest change occurs in the
parameter, the ciphertext will change dramatically (Alvarez et al. (2006)).
Various attacks such as the nonlinear forecasting, the return map, the adaptive parameter
estimation, the error function attack (EFA), and inverse computation based on the chosen
cipher attack, are proposed to recover messages from the chaotic ciphers (Zhou (2005)).
Short (Parke et al. (2001); Short (1994; 1996)) and Guojie et al. (Guojie et al. (2003)) have
proposed the attack strategies against chaotic communication systems. Short analyzed only
the encrypter by using the nonlinear forecastingmethod that belongs to ciphertext-only attack
when the attacker does not know the structure of the encryption system. They discussed
the secure property of chaos communication based on chaotic parameter modulation from
the chosen-ciphertext attack under the Kerckhoff principle (Guojie et al. (2003)). Guojie
et al. discussed the secure property of chaos communication based on chaotic parameter
modulation from the chosen-ciphertext attack under the Kerckhoff principle. We proposed
chaotic communication systems using the adaptive control and robust control technologies
(Matsuo et al. (2004; 2008)).
Wang et al. (Wang et al. (2004)) presented the error function attack to evaluate system
security as an efficient cryptanalysis tool based on the public-structure and known-plaintext
cryptanalysis. By defining the EFA function, an eavesdropper can scan the whole keyspace to
find out the proper key that satisfies the EFA function with zero value. Since keys that are not
identical with but are very close to the real one can be used to synchronize the two systems
very well, a key basin around the actual secret key is formed. Once the eavesdropper knows
the key basin, the correct key can be easily obtained through some optimization algorithms. To
evaluate the security performance,Wang et al. also defined the key basin width by the distance
between two trial keys located on the two sides of the key basin. The narrower than the whole
keyspace the key basin width is, the higher the security of the cryptosysytem is. However, a
systematic approach to get the key basin width is lacking. The brute-force-like calculations are
needed to draw the shape of the EFA function. Thus, a considerable computing time is needed
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to get the key basin width. If the EFA function has numerous minima and a needle-like basin,
the security level of the cryptosystem is high. In this case, the evolutionary optimization
techniques such as the particle swarm optimization cannot find the secret key using the
EFA function (Nomura et al. (2011)). Anstett et al. proposed a general framework based
on identifiability for the cryptanalysis of chaotic cryptosystems (Anstett et al. (2006)). They
also pointed out that cryptosystems involving polynomial nonlinearities are weak against a
known plaintext attack.
In this chapter, we propose an H∞ synchronizer in order to improve the robustness of chaotic
communication systems with respect to delays in the transmission line based on the standard
linear H∞ control theory. To begin with, we derive an error system between the encrypter
and the decrypter and reduce the design problem of the cryptosystem to the stabilization
problem of a generalized plant in the robust control theory. Next, we give a synchronizer
parameterization and an H∞ synchronizer based on the robust control theory. Furthermore,
the decrypter dynamics is designed via the linear controller parameterization to make the
decrypter robust against disturbances in transmission line and/or sensitive tomodeling errors
of the decrypter. We present two design requirements on the robustness and the security. We
need to design the free parameter such that both the requirements are satisfied. Since we
cannot get this solution simultaneously, we design the dynamical compensator so as to satisfy
the robustness requirement and then check the sensitivity to the key parameter mismatches
whether the parameters in encrypter may play the role of the secret key or not, numerically.
Finally, the proposed system is compared with that proposed by Grassi et al. using MATLAB
simulations.
The following notation is used (Doyle et al. (1989)) :
Fl(G,Q) : lower linear fractional transformation[
A B
C D
]
:= C(sI − A)−1B + D
2. Observer-based chaotic communication system with free dynamics
Grassi et al. (Grassi et al. (1999)) proposed a nonlinear-observer-based cryptosystem that is an
extension of the cryptosystem proposed by Yang et al. (Yang et al. (1997b)). The cryptographic
method consists of an encryption function (the multi-shift cipher), a decryption function (the
inverse of the encryption function), a chaotic encrypter that generates the key signal for the
encryption function, and a decrypter that estimates the key signal. The transmitted signal
through a public channel contains the nonlinear function that is equivalent to that of the
encrypter. We add a dynamic compensator in the transmitted signal to the observer-based
chaotic communication system proposed by Grassi et al. Figure 1 shows the relationship
among the encrypter, the observer-based decrypter and the adaptive decrypter where we use
the adaptive decrypter as a tool for ciphertext-only attacks.
The cryptosystem consists of an encryption function (the multi-shift cipher), a decryption
function (the inverse of the encryption function), a chaotic encrypter that generates the key
signal for the encryption function, and a decrypter that estimates the key signal.
• Part 1 : dynamic encrypter
The chaotic encrypter is described by the following equations:
x˙ = Ax + b2 f (x) + b2en (1)
v = P(s)x (2)
y = v + en + f (x) (3)
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Administrator
Encryption function
(n-shift cipher)
Key signal
Cipher text
Chaotic dynamics
(Generator for key and
transmitted signals)
Adaptive synchronizer
Adaptive decrypter
Intruder
Plain text
User
(n-shift cipher)
Decryption function
Estimate of key signal
Estimate of cipher text
Chaotic dynamics
Estimator for key signal and 
cipher text 
(Observer-based decrypter)
Recovered plain text
Fig. 1. Chaotic cryptosystem configuration.
where y is the transmitted signal that includes the nonlinear function, P(s) is a transfer
function that lets a decrypter synchronize the encrypter, and s = ddt . We call this transfer
function P(s) a synchronizer.
• Part 2 : encryption function
Given a plaintext signal p(t), the ciphertext en(t) is given by
en(t) = en(p(t),K(t)) (4)
where K(t) is a stream key signal that is generated by the encrypter dynamics and is given
by the following equation:
K(t) = kTx. (5)
The signal en is a generic encryption function that makes use of the key signal and we
choose a encryption function as the following n-shift cipher:
en(p(t),K(t)) = q(· · · q(q(p(t),K(t)),K(t)), · · · ),K(t))
q(x, k) =
⎧⎨
⎩
(x + k) + 2h, −2h ≤ (x + k) ≤ −h
(x + k), −h < (x + k) < h
(x + k)− 2h h ≤ (x + k) ≤ 2h
• Part 3 : dynamic decrypter with free dynamics
Given the encrypter, the decrypter used by an authorized user is the following observer:
˙ˆx = Axˆ + b2ey (6)
vˆ = P(s)xˆ (7)
ey = y− vˆ = P(s)(x − xˆ) + en + f (x) (8)
eˆn = y− (vˆ + f (xˆ)) (9)
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where eˆn is a recovered signal of the plain text.
• Part 4 : decryption function
Using the estimated signals Kˆ(t) and eˆn(t) by the decrypter, the estimate of the plaintext
pˆ(t) can be recovered by the following equations:
pˆ(t) = d(eˆn(t), Kˆ(t)) (10)
Kˆ(t) = kT xˆ (11)
where Kˆ is an estimate of the stream key signal and d is the decryption function given by
pˆ(t) = q(· · · q(q(eˆn(t),−Kˆ(t)),−Kˆ(t)), · · · ),−Kˆ(t)).
3. Design of H∞-synchronizer
3.1 Error equations and generalized system
If the transmitted signal is disturbed by an additional disturbance w(t), the signal is rewritten
by
y˜(t) = v(t) + en(t) + f (x(t)) + ω(t) (12)
When some of parameters of the dynamic encrypter are unknown, the dynamic decrypter
constructed by a receiver based on the information of the encrypter has parametric
uncertainties. The decrypter used by any receivers including intruders is given by
˙ˆx = A˜xˆ + b˜2ey (13)
vˆ = P˜(s)xˆ (14)
eˆn = y˜− (vˆ + f˜ (xˆ)) (15)
Denoting the uncertainties of A˜, b˜2 in the encrypter dynamics as ∆, the perturbed nonlinear
function of f (x) as f˜ (x), and the perturbation of the H∞ synchronizer as P˜(∗), we assume that
the decrypter with the uncertainties is given by
˙ˆx = Axˆ + b1∆ + b2ey (16)
vˆ = P˜(s)xˆ, ey = y˜ − vˆ (17)
eˆn = ey − f˜ (xˆ) = y˜ − (vˆ + f˜ (xˆ)). (18)
A decrypter used by an authorized user satisfies ∆(t) = 0, f (·) = f˜ (·), P(s) = P˜(s) since he
knows all parameters of the encrypter. On the other hand, a decrypter used by an intruder
has uncertainties in the encrypter dynamics, the nonlinear function, and the synchronizer.
In this chapter, we assume that the intruder knows the H∞ synchronizer, P(s) = P˜(s) but
does not know the values of A, b2, i.e. ∆(t) = 0, and the nonlinear function, i.e. f (·) = f˜ (·).
Defining the estimation error of the decrypter as e(t) = xˆ(t)− x(t), we have the following
error system:
e˙(t) = Ae(t) + b1∆(t) + b2ω(t)− b2ξ(t) (19)
ξ(t) = P(s)e (20)
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We assign the estimation error of the key signal eK or that of cipher text e˜n to the controlled
output as follows:
eK(t) = Kˆ(t) = k
Te(t)
e˜n = eˆn − en = y˜ − vˆ− f˜ (xˆ)− en
= −ξ + ( f (x)− f˜ (xˆ)) + ω
If limt→∞ ω(t) = 0,limt→∞( f (x)− f˜ (xˆ)) = 0 and limt→∞ e(t) = 0, then the plaintext can be
recovered by the decrypter ,limt→∞(en(t)− eˆn(t)) = 0.
Since f (·) = f˜ (·) for authorized users, we have
|e˜n| ≤ |ξ|+ | f (x)− f (xˆ)|+ |w|
≤ |P(s)e|+ γ‖e‖+ |w|.
Thus, if limt→∞ w(t) = 0 and limt→∞ e(t) = 0, then we attain the recover the plaintext, i.e.
limt→∞(en(t)− eˆn(t)) = 0.
For each controlled output, the generalized plant in Fig. 2 is defined as:
• When the controlled output is eK, the generalize plant is
G1(s) =
⎡
⎣ A [b1 b2] −b2kT 0 0
I 0 0
⎤
⎦ (21)
• When the controlled output is the upper bound of |e˜n|, the generalize plant is
G2(s) =
⎡
⎣ A [b1 b2] −b2kT [0 1] −1
I 0 0
⎤
⎦ . (22)
3.2 Synchronizer parameterization
To design the synchronizer based on the static output-feedback-based controller, we rewrite
the generalized plant as in Fig.2. Since we can select the input of the synchronizer as arbitrary
scalar signal, the signal in Eq.(2) is chosen as v(t) = P(s)x(t) = Po(s)c
Tx(t), where c is an
arbitrary vector.
We call a stabilizing compensator Po(s) for the generalized plant G(s) the synchronizer of the
chaotic cryptosystem. The design problem of the synchronizer is summarized as follows:
Given a generalized plant G(s) as in Fig. 2, parameterize all synchronizer P(s) that
internally stabilize G(s).
We consider the n-th order generalized plant in Fig.3, where (A, B2) is stabilizable and (A,C2)
is detectable;
Go(s) =
[
G11 G12
G21 G22
]
=
⎡
⎣ A B1 B2C1 D11 D12
C2 D21 0
⎤
⎦ (23)
and the p-th order dynamic stabilizing compensator,
Po(s) =
[
Ac Bc
Cc Dc
]
. (24)
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∆
ξ
eK, e˜n
e
Gi(s), i = 1, 2
Po(s)
w
cT
G(s)
Fig. 2. Generalized plant and synchronizer in the chaotic communication system.
u
z
y
Go(s)
Po(s)
w
Fig. 3. Generalized plant and controller in the robust control theory.
For any choice of K0, we can obtain the parameterization of K(s) as follows (Matsuo et al.
(1998)):
Po(s) = Fl(P˜o(s),Q(s)) (25)
P˜o(s) =
⎡
⎣ AK + H0C2 + B2F0 −H0 B2F0 K0 I
−C2 I 0
⎤
⎦ (26)
Q(s) =
[
Ac22 Bc2
Cc2 Dc2
]
AK = A + B2K0C2
where
Ac22 : stable
F0 s.t. AK + B2F0 is stable
H0 s.t. AK + H0C2 is stable.
Since Po(s) is a stabilizing compensator for each Q(s) ∈ RH∞, (25) is one of the
parameterization of stabilizing compensators. This LFT form is equal to the Youla
parameterization when the static output feedback gain, K0, is selected as zero. When the
generalized plant can be stabilized by a static output feedback gain, i.e. there exists an output
feedback gain K0 such that AK is stable, we can set H0 = 0, F0 = 0. In this case, the
449obu tness and Security of H∞-Synchron zer in Chaotic Communication System
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parameterization of all stabilizing compensators is as follows (Matsuo et al. (1998)):
Po(s) = Fl(P˜o(s),Q(s)) (27)
= K0 + Q(s)(I + C2(sI − AK)
−1B2Q(s))
−1 (28)
where
P˜o(s) =
⎡
⎣ AK 0 B20 K0 I
−C2 I 0
⎤
⎦ . (29)
In Fig. 2, since C2 is replace to c
T , where cT can be selected as an arbitrary vector, there exists
a scalar k0 such that Ak = A − b2k0c
T is stable, as long as (A, b2) is stabilizable. In this case,
we can set H0 = 0, F0 = 0. The parameterization of all synchronizers in Fig. 2 is obtained as
follows (Matsuo et al. (1998)):
Po(s) = Fl(P˜o(s),Q(s)) (30)
where Q(s) ∈ RH∞ and
P˜o(s) =
⎡
⎣ Ak 0 −b20 k0 1
−cT 1 0
⎤
⎦ . (31)
We call this parameterization a synchronizer parameterization. By selecting Po(s) as constant
gain k0 i.e. Q(s) = 0, the proposed cryptosystem is equivalent to that proposed by Grassi et al.
3.3 Design problem of H∞ synchronizer
The input-output relation of the generalized plant G(s) = G1(s) or G2(s) from the exogenous
input [∆ w] to the controlled output z is given by
z = Fl(G(s), P(s))
[
∆(s) w(s)
]T
(32)
=
[
T1(s) T2(s)
] [
∆(s) w(s)
]T
(33)
The free dynamics Q(s) is designed to make the decrypter robust against the disturbances in
the transmission line of sensitive to the modeling errors of the decrypter by intruders. We
present two design specifications:
1. Robustness requirement: The proposed decrypter can recover the plain text by the
transmitted signals when the generalized plant with the synchronizer is internally stable.
Moreover, the H∞ synchronizer has an additional synchronization property with respect
to plant uncertainties. To recover plain texts, the decrypter should be robust with respect
to time delay uncertainties in the transmission line. Design the free parameter Q(s) such
that for a given γ2,
‖T2(s)‖ < γ2. (34)
2. Security requirement: To attain the secure cryptosystem, the decrypter of the intruder
should not synchronize the encrypter. Therefore, The free parameter Q(s) is designed to
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the error system sensitive to ∆. Design the free parameter Q(s) such that for a given γ1,
σ{T1(jω)} > γ1, for ω ∈ [0,∞). (35)
However, since the generalized plant does not have a direct term from the uncertainty ∆
to the transmitted signal y˜, (35) cannot be hold for all ω ∈ [0,∞). Therefore, to satisfy
the security requirement, we change the transmitted signal y˜ and the feedback term in the
decrypter ey as
y˜(t) = v(t) + en(t) + f (x(t)) + ω(t) + c
T Ab2
ey = y˜ − vˆ − c
T A˜b˜2
In this case, the estimation error of the cipher text includes the direct term from the
uncertainty to the transmitted signal as follows:
e˜′n = ξ + ( f (x)− f˜ (xˆ)) + w + ∆
′
In particular, when there is a perturbation in the nonlinear function, f (x) = f˜ (xˆ) generates
the direct term from the uncertainty to the transmitted signal.
We need to design the free parameter such that both the requirements are satisfied. Since we
cannot get this solution, we design the dynamical compensator so as to satisfy the robustness
requirement, and then check the security requirement whether the error system is sensitive
to the modeling errors of the decrypter, i.e. the designed cryptosystem is secure against to
attacks by intruders.
4. Simulations
We design a robust cryptosystem via Chua’s circuits as in Yang et al. (Yang et al. (1997b)) and
in Fradkov et al. (Fradkov et al. (2000)), and carry out simulations using MATLAB/Simulink.
4.1 Encrypter based on Chua’s circuit
The chaotic encrypter based on the Chua’s circuit is given by
x˙ = Ax + b2 f (x1) + b2en (36)
y = P(s)x + en + f (x) (37)
f (x1) = Gbx1 +
1
2
(Ga − Gb)(|x1 + 1| − |x1 − 1|)
A =
⎡
⎣−p1 p1 01 −1 1
0 −p2 −p3
⎤
⎦
b2 =
⎡
⎣−p10
0
⎤
⎦ , x =
⎡
⎣ x1x2
x3
⎤
⎦
We select the parameters in the Chua’s circuit given by Liao et al. (Liao et al. (1999)) as p1 =
10,p2 = 13.14,p3 = 0.07727,Ga = −1.28, and Gb = −0.69. The initial conditions are given by
451obu tness and Security of H∞-Synchron zer in Chaotic Communication System
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x1(0) = 1.1, x2(0) = 0, x3(0) = 0
xˆ1(0) = 0, xˆ2(0) = 0, xˆ3(0) = 0
The encryption function is 30-shift cipher, the parameter h is equal to 1 and the key signal K(t)
is the second state variable x2, i.e.
K(t) =
[
0 1 0
]
x(t).
Moreover, we select cT = −
[
0 1 1
]
.
MATLAB has a built-in music file, handel.mat, with a short segment of Handel’s Messiah.
We use it as the plaintext signal.
4.2 Grassi-type system
In the encrypter presented by Grassi et al. (Grassi et al. (1999)), the dynamic synchronizer is
simplified as Po(s) = k0 = 0.8.
4.3 Design of H∞-synchronizer
The generalized plant G1(s) in designing the H∞ synchronizer is shown in Fig. 4. The
weighting function W(s) in the exogenous signal is selected as W(s) = 10 × 2.1LsLs+1 , L =
1× 10−3 and γ = 0.75 so as to stabilize the error system with time delay uncertainties. The
H∞ synchronizer is obtained by using MATLAB LMI toolbox as follows:
P(s) =
[
ak bk
ck dk
]
ak = 10
5
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
−0.8762 1.9816 −0.3890 0.0685
2.0890 −4.7937 0.9380 −0.1581
−0.4425 1.0122 −0.2074 0.0331
−2.2132 5.3464 −1.0531 −0.0258
⎤
⎦ ,
bk = 10
5
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
2.2024 −0.0009 0.0114
−5.3148 0.0046 0.0005
1.1245 0.0083 0.0008
5.8935 0.0186 −0.1098
⎤
⎦ ,
ck = 10
3
[
−0.0549 0.2164 −0.4198 −5.4334
]
,
dk =
[
0 0 0
]
.
4.4 Nominal performance of H∞-synchronizer
Figs. 5,6, and 7 show the responses of the Grassi-type decrypter and the H∞-type decrypter
of the nominal system. Fig 5 shows the plaintext and recovered signal for each decrypter. Fig
6 shows the transmitted signal and the estimation error of decrypter for each decrypter. Fig 7
shows the cipher text and the percentage error of the recovered signal for each decrypter. The
nominal system means that the communication system has neither time delay nor parameter
mismatches between the encrypter and the decrypter. The speed of response of the H∞-type
decrypter is faster than that of the Grassi-type.
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kT
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W(s)
w
−ξ
eK
e
Fig. 4. Generalized plant G1(s).
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Fig. 5. The plaintext and the recovered plaintext in the nominal transmission line. Above
left : the plaintext for the Grassi-type decrypter. Above right : the plaintext for the
H∞-synchronizer. Below left : the recovered plaintext by the Grassi-type decrypter. Below
right : the recovered plaintext by the H∞-synchronizer.
4.5 Robustness of H∞-synchronizer against time delay in transmission line
Figs. 6 and 7 show the responses of the Grassi-type decrypter and the H∞-type decrypter
for the generalized plant G1(s)in the presence of the time delay L = 0.1 in the transmission
line, respectively. The responses of the H∞-type decrypter for the generalized plant G2(s) in
the presence of the time delay L = 0.1 in the transmission line is almost same as that for the
generalized plant G1(s). The H∞-type decrypter has a better robust performance to the time
delay than the Grassi-type.
4.6 Security performance of H∞-synchronizer
We assume that intruders have parameter mismatches in the decrypter. In this simulation, we
consider the following parameter mismatches:
vˆ = P(s)xˆ, eˆn = y− (vˆ + f˜ (xˆ))
A˜ =
⎡
⎣−p1 p1 01 −1 1
0 − p˜2 −p3
⎤
⎦
f˜ (x1) = G˜bx1 +
1
2
(G˜a − G˜b)(|x1 + 1| − |x1 − 1|)
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Fig. 6. The transmitted signal and the estimation error of decrypter in the nominal
transmission line. Above left : the transmitted signal(solid line) and the plain text(dotted
line) of the Grassi-type decrypter. Above right : the transmitted signal(solid line) and the
plain text(dotted line) of the decrypter with the H∞-synchronizer . Below left : the estimation
errors of full states of the Grassi-type decrypter. Below right : the estimation errors of full
states of the decrypter with the H∞-synchronizer.
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Fig. 7. The cipher text and the percentage error of the recovered signal in the nominal
transmission line. Above left : the ciphertext in the Grassi-type decrypter. Above right : the
ciphertext in the decrypter with the H∞-synchronizer. Below left : the percentage error of the
recovered signal of the Grassi-type decrypter. Below right : the percentage error of the
recovered signal of the decrypter with the H∞-synchronizer.
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Fig. 8. The plaintext and the recovered plaintext in the transmission line with delay time.
Above left : the plaintext for the Grassi-type decrypter. Above right : the plaintext for the
H∞-synchronizer. Below left : the recovered plaintext by the Grassi-type decrypter. Below
right : the recovered plaintext by the H∞-synchronizer.
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Fig. 9. The transmitted signal and the estimation error of the decrypter in the transmission
line with delay time Above left : the transmitted signal(solid line) and the plain text(dotted
line) of the Grassi-type decrypter. Above right : the transmitted signal(solid line) and the
plain text(dotted line) of the decrypter with the H∞-synchronizer . Below left : the estimation
errors of full states of the Grassi-type decrypter. Below right : the estimation errors of full
states of the decrypter with the H∞-synchronizer.
In this simulation, we select the candidates of the static secret keys as the parameters p2,Ga,Gb,
and P(s). Intruder A has the following parameter mismatch:
p˜2 = 13.15, p2 = 13.14
G˜a = Ga = −1.28, G˜b = Gb = −0.69
P˜(s) = P(s).
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Fig. 10. The cipher text and the percentage error of the recovered signal in the transmission
line with delay time. Above left : the ciphertext in the Grassi-type decrypter. Above right :
the ciphertext in the decrypter with the H∞-synchronizer. Below left : the percentage error of
the recovered signal of the Grassi-type decrypter. Below right :the percentage error of the
recovered signal of the decrypter with the H∞-synchronizer.
Intruder B has the following parameter mismatches:
p˜2 = p2 = 13.14,
G˜a = −1.3, G˜b = −0.65
P˜(s) = P(s).
Figs. 11,12, and 13 show the responses of the H∞-type decrypter used by the intruders A and
B, respectively. The proposed synchronizer is sensitive to the parameter mismatches caused
by Intruder A. The parameters in the dynamic encrypter may play the role of the secret key.
However, Intruder A can identify the recovered wav file as the Handel’s Messiah in spite of
noisy sound. Fig. 14 shows the EFA function of the proposed H∞-type decrypter. Since the
width of the key basin in EFA function is not so narrow, the cryptosystem is not so secure.
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Fig. 11. The plaintext and the recovered plaintext by the intruders A and B. Above left : the
plaintext. Above right : the plaintext. Below left : the recovered plaintext by Intruder A.
Below right : the recovered plaintext by Intruder B.
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Fig. 12. The transmitted signals and the estimation errors of the intruders’ decrypters. Above
left : the transmitted signal(solid line) and the plain text(dotted line). Above right : the
transmitted signal(solid line) and the plain text(dotted line). Below left : the estimation errors
of full states by Intruder A. Below right : the estimation errors of full states by Intruder B.
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Fig. 13. The cipher text and the percentage error of the recovered signal in the transmission
line with delay time. Above left : the ciphertext. Above right : the ciphertext. Below left : the
percentage error of the recovered signal by Intruder A. Below right : the percentage error of
the recovered signal by Intruder B.
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Fig. 14. The key basin of p2 in EFA function for H∞ synchronizer.
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To improve the security of the H∞ synchronizer, we select the secret key as a element of P(s).
Intruder C has the following parameter mismatch in the H∞ synchronizer:
p˜2 = p2 = 13.14
G˜a = Ga = −1.28, G˜b = Gb = −0.69
P˜(s) =
[
a˜k bk
ck dk
]
a˜k(1, 1) = ak(1, 1) + 450
The parameter mismatch of the element ak(1, 1) is about 0.51%, because ak(1, 1) = −0.8762×
105.
Figs. 15,16, and 17 show the responses of the H∞-type decrypter used by Intruder C. In this
case, the decrypter with the parameter mismatch causes instability. The parameters in the H∞
synchronizer P˜(s)may play the role of the secret key.
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Fig. 15. The plaintext (top) and the recovered plaintext by Intruder C (bottom).
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Fig. 16. The transmitted signal (top) and the estimation error of decrypter by Intruder C
(bottom).
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Fig. 17. The cipher text (top) and the percentage error of the recovered signal by Intruder C
(bottom).
5. Conclusion
In this chapter, we added an observer-based chaotic communication system proposed by
Grassi et al. to a dynamical compensator in its transmitted signal to improve the robustness
of the cryptosystem with respect to delays in the transmission line. The proposed chaotic
system has a good robust performance with respect to the time delay in the transmission line.
Moreover, we checked the security in a point of parameters mismatch by an intruder.
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